Monopolies—Interstate Commerce—Organized Baseball by Gottesman, Robert S.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 1 Number 3 Article 27 
4-1-1952 
Monopolies—Interstate Commerce—Organized Baseball 
Robert S. Gottesman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert S. Gottesman, Monopolies—Interstate Commerce—Organized Baseball, 1 Buff. L. Rev. 342 (1952). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol1/iss3/27 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ 
University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized 
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
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Appeals pointed out the irreconcilable conflict of the decisions in this regard,
Reilley v.-Steinhart 217 N. Y. 549, 112 N. E. 468 (1916) and subsequently
refused to answer the question directly. Franklin Sugar Refining Co. V. Lipowicz
247 N. Y. 465, 160 N. B. 916 (1928). Only recently it has been held that in the
absence of an express intention to the contrary the N. Y. Statute of Frauds (N. Y.
Pers. Prop. Law Sec. 31(1) is to be characterized as substantive. Silverman v'.
Indevco Inc. 106 N. Y. S. 2d 699 (1951). It was Story's original position that
the requirement of writing under the Statute of Frauds is substantive, Story,
Conflict of Laws §262 (1st ed., 1834), and his views were urged upon the English
court in Leroux v. Brown, supra.
Professor Morgan has expressed the view that the law of the locus should
be applied even to matters of procedure if they are likely to have a material
influence on the outcome of the case as long as its application would not violate
the public policy of the forum. Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 Harv.
L Rev. 153, 195 (1944).
It is submitted that the court in the principal case follow the better rule in
characterizing the N. Y. Statute of Frauds as substantive. Effect is thus given to
the contract valid in the state where made, which has the closest connection with
the contract, and the outcome of the case will not depend on the state in which




Plaintiff, a professional baseball player, sued the defendant baseball clubs
and leagues under the Sherman Act (26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. A. §§1, 2) and
Clayton Act (38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C A. §15), alleging that he was deprived of
his livelihood by the defendants. The complaint was dismissed for want of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; the court holding that baseball was not
interstate commerce and defendant's activity was not within the purview of the
antitrust legislation. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc. et al., 101 F. Supp. 93
(S. D. Cal. 1951).
The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 in order to suppress devices and
practices which tend toward monopolies in restraint of interstate commerce.
U. S. v. Colgate, 250 U. S. 300 (1919); D. R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products
Ref. Co., 236 U. S. 165 (1915); Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197
(1904). Early applications of the statute were limited to activities which were
obviously interstate commerce. U. S. v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505
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(1898); Northern Securities Co. v. U. S. supra, (interstate carriers). Local
activities which only affected interstate commerce were not held to be within the
scope of the act. U. S. v. E. C. Knight, 156 U. S. 1 (1895) (monopoly in sugar
industry).
Since these early decisions, the court's interpretation of interstatecommerce
has been extended to include many local activities which only incidentally affect
interstate commerce. These include: manufacturing, N. L. R. B. v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937); agriculture, Wlickard v. Filburn, 317
U S. 111 (1942); intrastate railroads, Houston, East & West Texas Ry. Co. v.
U. S., 234 U. S. 342 (1914); practice of medicine, American Medical Association
v. U. S., 110 F2d 703 (1940), cert. denied 310 U. S. 644 (194 0);.insurance,
U. S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 332 U. S. 533 (1944); trade in
news among the states, Associated Press v. U. S., 326 U. S. 1 (1945); theatrical
productions, Ring v. Spina, 148 F2d 647 (1945); motion pictures, U. S. v. Para-
mount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131 (1948); and fixing local prices, Mandeville Island
Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219 (1948).
Baseball, however, was held not to be interstate commerce in Federal Baseball
Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs et al.,
259 U. S. 200 (1922). The court based its decision on two grounds: (1) labor
expended other than in the production of goods is not commerce; and (2) the
transportation of players and equipment across state lines is merely incident to
the chief purpose of baseball clubs.
Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648 (1895) was cited to support the first
test. But the Hooper case has been completely undermined by U. S. v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Assn., supra, which held insurance to be interstate commerce
within the scope of the antitrust statutes. Similarly, other fields involving the use
of labor other than in the production of goods have been found to be commerce
under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Ring v. Spina, supra; Asso. Press v. U. S.,
supra; American Medical Asso. v. U. S., supra.
The incidental test 'has been used by the cotirt in several cases to determine
whether defendant's activities constituted interstate commerce. Northern Securi-
ties Co. v. U. S., supra; Standard Oil Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197 (1904); Apex
Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469 (1940). However, this approach was seriously
impaired when the court in Wickard v. Filburn, supra, ruled that a farmer's
production of only 239 bushels of wheat in excess of his quota, set under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (52 Star. 31, as amended 7 U. S. C. §1281
et seq.), had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. This result was reached
even though defendant's activities were purely local and the excess wheat was in-
tended for his personal consumption. Cf: Mandeville Island Farms Inc. v. American
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Crystal Sugar Co., supra; Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U. S.,
173 (1946); Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co., 327 U. S. 178 (1946); Roland
Electric Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657 (1946). Contra: North American Co. v.
Securities Exchange Commission, 327 U. S. 686 (1946).
The Federal Baseball case, supra, was not followed in Gardella v. Chandler,
172 F. 2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949). The court distinguished present day baseball
from that of 1922 and held it to be now within the scope of the antitrust statutes.
Radio and television broadcasting of games were the principal grounds of distinc-
tion. The court compared the televising of games to a theatrical production in
which the viewers, although in a different state from the source of the broadcast,
are the spectators and the players the actors, together forming an indivisible unit.
Organized Baseball has grown considerably since the time of the Federal
Baseball Case. Today players are more frequently shuttled back and forth across
state lines to play games and to carry out their assignments in the extensive farm
systems. In 1951 the 16 major league teams owned a total of 175 farm clubs
scattered throughout the United States and Canada. World's Series receipts for
the 4 games played in 1950 amounted to $1,928,669.03 of which $975,000.00 was
derived from national radio and television broadcasting of the games. See Baseball
Guide and Record Book 1951, pp. 130, 158.
It is submitted that Organized Baseball's present interstate features combined
with its monopolistic practices are sufficient to bring it within the antitrust acts.
Future exemptions from these statutes, if necessary to baseball's continued existence
and the public interest, should be made by Congressional enactment and not
by the courts.
Robert S. Gottesman
LABOR LAW-UNION LIABILITY FOR CONCERTED ACTION
WHERE THERE IS AN ALTERNATIVE JUDICIAL REMEDY
The plaintiff employed a member of one of the defendant unions who had
been fired and suspended for a violation of a union rule. When the plaintiff
refused the local Building Trades Council's request that the employee be compelled
to pay the fine or be discharged, the Council called the workers off the job and
together with the other unions, picketed and boycotted to compel compliance with
their demands. An added condition to the resumption of work was the payment
of a sum of money to a charity as a penalty on the employer. The employer
thereupon sued the Building Trades Council, the participating locals and their
agents on two counts for damages arising out of the work stoppage. The Nevada
court found for the plaintiff on both counts holding that (1) to compel payment
